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ABSTRACT
Device identication is the process of identifying a device on Inter-
net without using its assigned network or other credentials. e
sharp rise of usage in Internet of ings (IoT) devices has imposed
new challenges in device identication due to a wide variety of de-
vices, protocols and control interfaces. In a network, conventional
IoT devices identify each other by utilizing IP or MAC addresses,
which are prone to spoong. Moreover, IoT devices are low power
devices with minimal embedded security solution. To mitigate
the issue in IoT devices, ngerprint (DFP) for device identication
can be used. DFP identies a device by using implicit identiers,
such as network trac (or packets), radio signal, which a device
used for its communication over the network. ese identiers
are closely related to the device hardware and soware features.
In this paper, we exploit TCP/IP packet header features to create
a device ngerprint utilizing device originated network packets.
We present a set of three metrics which separate some features
from a packet which contribute actively for device identication.
To evaluate our approach, we used publicly accessible two datasets.
We observed the accuracy of device genre classication 99.37% and
83.35% of accuracy in the identication of an individual device from
IoT Sentinel dataset. However, using UNSW dataset device type
identication accuracy reached up to 97.78%.
CCS CONCEPTS
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KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Device identication is the process of identifying a device on Inter-
net without using its network identiers or other credentials such
as IP address, Medium Access Control (MAC) address, Electronic
Serial Number (ESN), International Mobile Station Equipment Iden-
tity (IMEI) number or Mobile Identication Number (MIN). ese
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identiers can be altered or manipulated by using expert knowledge
of networking or soware, which can create signicant security
threats where devices identication play key security roles. DFP
exploits device-specic signature or packet information (feature set)
which the device uses for communication over the network [3]. Ef-
fective device ngerprint must assure two aributes (i) the features
are hard to forge, (ii) the DFP remains stable even when devices
move from one network to another network [17]. DFP has emerged
as a signicant solution for device identication (or authentication)
due to its resistance against vulnerabilities such as node forgery
or masquerading in IoT network. Features used for DFP are classi-
ed based on their extraction methods. ere are two techniques
namely active and passive which have been observed to impact
the identication of devices. In active ngerprinting, devices are
probed with dierent types of packets and the subsequent received
responses are analyzed to aain unique ngerprints. In contrast, in
passive ngerprinting, a proler observes ongoing communication
of the target system without any obvious querying into the system,
by analyzing and extracting information from transmied packets.
In this paper, we used passively observed datasets to evaluate the
proposed method, our DFP approach is for passive ngerprinting.
A DFP approach proposed based on the analysis of (each packet)
23 features from 12 network packets by Mieinen et al. [10]. e set
of features were represented as binary (0 or 1) and integer values,
where binary value 1 dene the protocol used during communica-
tion. Overall, the scheme achieved identication accuracy of 81.50%
(global ratio) over the 27 devices using the IoT Sentinel dataset [10].
e single packet-based DFP method [1] uses genetic algorithm
(GA) to determine the feature subset which contributes substan-
tially, for generation of device ngerprint used for device identi-
cation. is approach has been shown to achieve approximate
classication accuracy of over 95% for device genre and 82% for in-
dividual device type using 23 IoT devices from IoT Sentinel dataset
[10].
We worked on a device ngerprinting approach using packets
header information (distinct protocols header features) from the tar-
get devices to extract a unique set of features (actual feature values)
to generate device ngerprint. Features are assessed using three
metrics: the variability of a feature, the stability of a feature, and
the suitability of a feature, to learn the most suitable feature subset.
Metrics evaluation results assign a score to each of the features to
form a feature vector. e feature set is subsequently processed to
lter feature subset according to the user-dened threshold value λ
whereas a lambda value ranged between 0 and less than 1. Finally,
we used machine learning (ML) classication algorithms to classify
individual IoT device type or genre by using selected feature subset
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vectors of each device. While two algorithms, such as J48 and PART,
outperformed compare to other classication algorithms. However,
based on the user expected accuracy λ value can be changed empir-
ically. To evaluate our proposed DFP method we used two publicly
available datasets: IoT Sentinel dataset [10] and UNSW dataset [16].
While we achieved approximate classication accuracy to 99.37%
for device genre and 83.35% for individual device type by using IoT
Sentinel dataset [10] and 97.78% of precision achieved using 10678
instances from UNSW dataset [16] for identication of individual
device type. e contributions of this paper are the following:
• We present a conceptual IoT network model incorporat-
ing device identication with a wide range of IoT devices
(Section 2).
• We introduce metric-entropy based packet header features
assessment methodology using three metrics for device
ngerprinting and design of our proposed DFP approach
(Section 5).
• We examine proposed DFP method using two datasets,
which consists of various real-world IoT devices (Section
6).
e rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
a conceptual IoT network model to depict the DFP incorporated in
the IoT network. In Section 3, notations and device information
are presented, and preliminary of the metrics evaluation process is
discussed in Section 4. e proposed DFP approach is illustrated
in Section 5, while experimental results with the dierent datasets
are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 addresses related work and
Section 8 presents the conclusion and the future direction of work.
2 IOT NETWORK MODEL INCORPORATING
DEVICE IDENTIFICATION
We presume that our network model comprises of various types
of IoT devices, which are used in smart homes, smart buildings
or enterprises [14]. In a network, most of the devices, such as
IP cameras (TP-LinkCam, EdimaxCam), smart bulbs, connect to
the user’s network (a single access point gateway) directly either
through WiFi (wireless delity) or Ethernet connection to access
the Internet services.
Most of the devices are identied by using explicit identiers,
such as IP address, MAC address and other network identities.
Devices use these identiers to communicate on the network. Un-
fortunately, all these identiers have been exhibited to be easily
mutable by using soware [5]. Spoong is one of the techniques
which can forge a device explicit identier to gain illegitimate ac-
cess to restricted resources in the network. For example, an ioctl
system call can be used to forge or modify MAC address of a de-
vice network interface card (NIC) [17] to access a network (e.g. a
corporate oce) where devices are recognized by using their MAC
addresses. Similarly, IoT Node using spoofed IP address can launch
crucial aacks while communicating with an access point (AP) to
get required services. Initially, each device on the IoT network is
identied by using their unique IPv4 address, however, even IP
address is spoofed than also it would be unique. Moreover the
range of spoofed IP address is restricted by type of the network e.g.
256 in case of Type C network.
IoT devices are classied as resource-constrain devices [6] in
terms of processing power, communication capability, memory and
energy, while complex cryptography algorithms can be used to
secure the device identity. erefore, while communicating the en-
crypted data, the processing power of devices must be preserved. In
other words, a secure method is required to identify devices without
using the traditional identiers, such as IP address or MAC address.
An intuition that network trac provides device-specic signa-
ture since devices comprised dierent types of hardware-soware
and used distinct communication protocols in a network. DFP is a
technique to identify IoT devices using network trac information
from the target devices. Conceptual network model is shown in
Figure 1 wherein the proposed DFP method can be used to generate
unique identiers of IoT devices to overcome the spoofed network
identities of the device.
Figure 1: Conceptual IoT network model of the proposed
method
We assume that our proposed DFP scheme is able to capture all
types of network trac (inbound and outbound trac) passively
on the access point (AP). e IoT Node communicate for various
services e.g. DNS to translate domain name of Internet resources,
SSL/TLS certicates to encrypt and decrypt data, NTP server to syn-
chronize device time, and Manufacture server to upgrade rmware
services. is communication of IoT Node is captured on the AP
shown in Figure 1. In the proposed model packets payload informa-
tion are not considered, which can be plain text, compressed, binary
or encrypted data. We only focused on packet header features (or
elds) [4], [10], [1]. An intuition that distinct protocols features
from the packet header provide a signicant ngerprint for device
identication. is ngerprint is generated using header informa-
tion of all the packets and regularly updated on the device identier
station. Device identier evaluates the feature set from n number of
packets from each device to determine the most suitable subset of
features and then train a model for devices classication using an
ML classication algorithm. Finally, the AP uses this classication
model to authenticate devices in the IoT network.
3 NOTATIONS AND DATASETS
A list of notations used to describe our proposed DFP approach are
listed in Table 1 along with a description of each notation.
Table 1: A list of notations
Notation Description
pkt : A TCP/IP packet
t : Total number of packets or instances
r : r th number of packet
f : A feature in a packet
m : Total number of features in a packet
j : jth number of feature in a packet
d : An IoT Device
n : Total number of devices in a dataset
blk : A block of packets
k : Total number of packets in a block
b : Total number of blocks
str : A string (concatenated features values)
c : Total number of distinct characters in a string
i : ith number of character in a string
P(strfji ) : Discrete probability density function
H (strfj ) : Metric-entropy value calculation function
L : Total length of a string
sd : Individual device stability vector
v : Variability vector of the features
s : Stability vector of the features
u : Suitability vector of the features
l : lth number of device in a dataset
‖ : Concatenation operation
λ : A threshold value (Lambda)
∗ : Multiplication operation
We utilized publicly available two datasets to evaluate our pro-
posed DFP method. e datasets are IoT Sentinel [10] dataset and
UNSW [16] dataset containing dierent types of IoT devices. We
use a total of 27 IoT devices from IoT Sentinel dataset. ere
are a total 12 genres or groups of devices in IoT Sentinel [10]:
Aria, D-Link (D-LinkCam, D-LinkDayCam, D-LinkDoorSensor,
D-LinkHomeHub, D-LinkSensor, D-LinkSiren, D-LinkSwitch and
D-LinkWaterSensor), Hue (HueSwitch and HueBridge), Smarter
(iKele2 and SmarterCoee), Lightify, MAXGateway, TP-Link (TP-
LinkPlugHS100 and TP-LinkPlugHS110), WeMo (WeMoInsightSwitch,
WeMoLink and WeMoSwitch) and Withings. We use a total of 19
devices from UNSW dataset. All these devices information are listed
in Table 2 and Table 3.
[Note: ? indicates devices are from the same manufacturer as
above]
4 PRELIMINARIES
Robyns et al. [13] dened three metrics: (a) the variability of a bit
(b) the stability of a bit and (c) the suitability of a bit for bitwise
entropy evaluation of a Probe-Request frame on a WiFi network.
Table 2: IoT Sentinel dataset- the list of devices [10]
Manufacturer Device Connectivity
Fitbit Aria WiFi
D-Link D-LinkCam WiFi
? D-LinkDayCam WiFi/Ethernet
? D-LinkDoorSensor Z-Wave
? D-LinkSensor WiFi
? D-LinkWaterSensor WiFi
? D-LinkSiren WiFi
? D-LinkHomeHub WiFi/Ethernet/Z-wave
? D-LinkSwitch WiFi
Edimax EdimaxCam1 WiFi/Ethernet
? EdimaxPlug1101W WiFi
? EdimaxPlug2101W WiFi
Ednet EdnetCam1 WiFi/Ethernet
Ednet.Living EdnetGateway WiFi/Other
HomeMatic HomeMaticPlug Other
Philips Hue HueBridge ZigBee/Ethernet
? HueSwitch ZigBee
Smarter iKele2 WiFi
? SmarterCoee WiFi
Osram Lightify WiFi/ZigBee
eQ-3 MAXGateway Ethernet/Other
TP-Link TP-LinkPlugHS100 WiFi
? TP-LinkPlugHS110 WiFi
Belkin (Wemo) WeMoInsightSwitch WiFi
? WeMoLink WiFi/ZigBee
? WeMoSwitch WiFi
Withings Withings WiFi
e dened metric variability aains ideal value 1 when the
feature (particular eld of packet format) over the multiple trans-
mission from the devices is highly variable over all the devices and
therefore uniquely contribute to ngerprint of the device e.g IP
address of a device is unique and therefore contribute highly to the
feature set for ngerprinting the device.
Similarly, the dened metric stability aains ideal value 1 when
the feature among other features of the device uniquely identify the
device and remains stable over the multiple transmissions from the
device. e dened metric suitability uses variability, and stability
by multiplying to calculate the feature suitability. Robyns et al.
evaluated suitability of features e.g. SSID, vendor specic data, HT
capabilities in a frame to identify the mobile devices. e authors
included the MAC address while evaluating frame for the metrics.
We dene the metrics at character-level for packet header analy-
sis on 212 set of features and improve the IoT Sentinel dataset classi-
cation compared to [1] without IP address and the method outper-
formed with IP address. e character-level metric is more promis-
ing, as the bit-wise metric evaluate the probability density of frame
vector over {0, 1,none} while character level metric evaluate the
probability density value of feature vector over{0, 1, . . . , 9,none}.
e bit wise evaluation [13] drops the accuracy gradually e.g the
reported accuracy of 10-100 devices including MAC Address is
60-87%.
Table 3: UNSW dataset - the list of devices [16]
Manufacturer Device Connectivity
Amazone AmazoneEcho WiFi
Belkin BelkinMotion WiFi
? BelkinSwitch WiFi
Blipcare BlipcareBpMeter WiFi
Google Nest DropCam WiFi
HP HP-Printer WiFi
iHome iHomePlug WiFi
Lifx LiFX WiFi
Nest NestSmoke WiFi
Netatmo NetatmoCam WiFi
? NetatmoWeather WiFi
Pixstar PixstarPhotoFrame WiFi
Samsung SamsungCam WiFi
Smartings Smartings Wired
TP-Link TP-LinkCam WiFi
? TP-LinkPlug WiFi
Triby TribySpeaker WiFi
Withings WithingsScale WiFi
? WithingsSleep WiFi
5 DEVICE IDENTIFICATION- DEVICE
FINGERPRINTING APPROACH
In this section, we describe major components of our device n-
gerprinting method to identify IoT device type or genre based on a
single TCP/IP packet. is method appraises Network layer (IP and
ICMP), Transport layer (TCP and UDP) and Application layer (DNS,
HTTP, TLS/SSL and DHCP) protocols header elds (or features) to
learn the most suitable subset of features among a large number of
features, which can be used for device ngerprinting. We dene
three character-level metrics, variability of a feature, stability of a
feature, and suitability of a feature to assess the feature set. is
process identies a suitable subset of features which are unique
to each device, while a lambda value is utilized to lter selected
feature subset according to the expected accuracy. en we perform
a machine learning classication algorithm to identify or classify
individual IoT device type or genre by using a selected subset of fea-
tures. e entire process of our proposed DFP scheme is illustrated
in Figure 2.
5.1 Packet Header Features
In the proposed system, we used device originated network trac
or packets to extract a list of features from each packet header
elds. A total m = 218 features extract from a single packet pktr =
(f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, f6, . . . . . . , fm−1, fm ) based on the contents of a
packet header information, where r ∈ (1, 2, 3 . . . . . . , t − 1, t ). Most
of the values of the features are of integer type except from some
features from the DHCP protocol, which include both integer and
string values. For a range of string values, we convert to nominal
values by using StrinдToNominal function in WEKA tool [7]. Ad-
ditionally, we eschew IP address and IP checksum for the proposed
DFP. e set of features used for our DFP scheme is partially listed
in Table 4, where all features are based on distinct protocols header
elds to ensure that the proposed method can be used for all types
of network trac like as plain-text, compressed data, binary or
encrypted trac.
Table 4: List of the protocols header elds (or features)
Layers Protocols Features
Link Layer - - - - - -
Network Layer IP, ICMP ip.hdr len,
(33 features) ip.dseld,
ip.dseld.dscp,
ip.proto, ip.l,
ip.opt.len, ip.opt.ra,
ip.opt.type, icmp.code,
icmp.checksum,
icmp.type, icmp.seq, etc.
Transport Layer TCP, UDP tcp.srcport,
(64 features) tcp.dstport, tcp.hdr len,
tcp.window size,
tcp.checksum,
tcp.connection.syn,
tcp.analysis.ack r,
udp.srcport,
udp.checksum,
udp.checksum.status,
udp.stream, etc.
Application Layer DNS, HTTP, dns.ags, dns.id,
SSL/TSL, dns.qry.name.len,
DHCP dns.count.queries,
(121 features) hp.request,
hp.response,
hp.request number,
tls.handshake.version,
tls.handshake, dhcp.id,
dhcp.option.hostname, etc.
5.2 Feature Subset Selection
We noticed that from our literature studies [1], [4], [2], [12], [11] a
small number of features is sucient to identify most of the devices
with high accuracy. erefore, instead of manually or randomly
selecting a suitable subset of features for DFP, it would be rational
to identify the most suitable feature subset automatically from a
large number of protocol header features. To accomplish this goal
our proposed DFP methodology comprises of the character-level
analysis on packet header features using the three metrics [13]: (a)
the variability metric of a feature (b) the stability metric of a feature
and (c) the suitability metric of a feature.
We measure on three character-level metrics of a feature obtained
from b blocks of packets transmied by the device. Hence, from ev-
ery device b number of blocks values are concatenated individually
based on each feature, such asblk1(fj )‖blk2(fj )‖ . . . ‖blkb−1(fj )‖blkb (fj ),
j ∈ (1, 2, 3, . . . . . . ,m − 1,m), to determine a metric-entropy [15]
value of that particular feature, wherein, a block comprises of k
number of packets transmied by an IoT device over the network
during communication.
Figure 2: A workow of the proposed DFP method
A feature values from k number of packets are concatenated,
like as pkt1(fj )‖pkt2(fj )‖..‖pktk−1(fj )‖pktk (fj ), to form a string
strfj to compute metric-entropy (Eq. 1) value of that feature.
H (strfj ) =
−∑ci=1 P(strfji ) × loд2P(strfji )
L
(1)
Where metric-entropy denes randomness of a feature string,
P(strfji ) characterizes discrete probability density of individual
character from a given string and a total number of unique character
in a string is delimited by c . Each metric-entropy value ranges from
0 to less than 1, wherein 0 means no entropy value.
Calculation of e Variability Metric: A feature variability
is assessed based on the metric-entropy value of that feature calcu-
lated from a dierent set of devices, where equal number of blocks
of packets were chosen from each device for assessment. A fea-
ture metric-entropy value calculates fromn number of blocks, while
blocks are concatenated, such asd1blk1strf1 ‖d2blk1strf1 ‖d3blk1strf1
‖ . . . ‖dnblk1strf1 ,d1blk1strf2 ‖d2blk1strf2 ‖d3blk1strf2 ‖ . . . . . . . . . ‖
dnblk1strf2 , . . . ,d1blk1strfm ‖d2blk1strfm ‖d3blk1strfm ‖ . . . . . . . . . ‖
dnblk1strfm , individually to compute variability (Eq. 1) value of
that feature. e variability vector v can be demonstrated as:
v = [Hstrf1 ,Hstrf2 ,Hstrf3 ,Hstrf4 ,Hstrf5 . . . ,Hstrfm ]
e objective of this variability metric is to identify the least
number of features which provide a unique contribution for device
ngerprinting.
Calculation of e Stability Metric: e stability vector s
dene how likely feature values remain stable over multiple trans-
mission from the same device, which can be used for device nger-
printing. Consequently, rst we measure individual device stability
vector sdl represented as:
sdl = [1 − Hstrf1 , 1 − Hstrf2 , 1 − Hstrf3 . . . , 1 − Hstrfm ]
en, device-specic stability vector from all devices are averaged
to assess the nal stability vector s . e goal of the stability metric
is to identify a set of features that are associated with devices and
varies less frequently.
s(fj ) =
∑n
l=1 sdl (fj )
n
(2)
Calculation of e Suitability Metric: We determine the
most suitable set of features by combining the variability and sta-
bility metrics. Hypothetically, the features utilized for our DFP
approach should be highly variable and stable to achieve higher
classication accuracy. For instance, a feature metric-entropy value
with 0.5 variability and 0.99 stability provides approximately higher
suitability, whereas a feature with zero variability and 0.99 stability
is considered unsuitable to use for ngerprint. We incorporate
these two metrics by using multiplication operation to aain the
suitability vector u of the features (Eq. 3):
u = v ∗ s (3)
e suitability vector u can be represented as u = [vf1 ∗ sf1 ,vf2 ∗
sf2 ,vf3 ∗ sf3 ,vf4 ∗ sf4 , . . . ,vfm−1 ∗ sfm−1 ,vfm ∗ sfm ]. Henceforth, a
threshold value λ is used to experimentally assess the feature sub-
set according to the user’s expected accuracy and to include those
features which have suitability value greater than the threshold. A
λ value inuences the trade-o between a feature uniqueness and
suitability to be used for device ngerprint. Table 5 presents assess-
ment results of some features evaluated by using the three metrics,
while features are randomly selected from the IoT Sentinel dataset
and a λ value dened experimentally to exclude (x) or include (X)
features for device ngerprinting.
5.3 Device Classication
In the preceding subsection, we explained how to choose the most
suitable subset of features from packet header elds that can be
used for devices classication by using ML algorithms. We used
WEKA (Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis) tool [7] to
perform various ML classication algorithms, such as PART and J48
Decision Trees, to classify IoT devices based on distinct protocol
header features from a single packet of a device. We observed
that PART and J48 algorithms provide higher accuracy than other
algorithms available in WEKA libraries. Our proposed method
utilizes real values of the features to facilitate both algorithms to
identify devices with high accuracy.
5.3.1 Identification of device genre and individual device type.
• Identication of device genre: We use a total of 27 IoT
devices from IoT Sentinel dataset, those devices are catego-
rized based on their manufacturer name or device name (if
a single device from manufacture) and then apply proposed
DFP method to classify individual device genre.
Table 5: Randomly selected few features suitability metric
evaluation results
Features u λ
u ¿ λ 0.0
ip.hdr len 0.0002 X
ip.dseld 0.0 x
ip.dseld.dscp 0.0001 X
ip.proto 0.0005 X
ip.l 0.0004 X
ip.opt.len 0.0 x
ip.opt.ra 0.0 x
ip.opt.type 0.005 X
icmp.checksum 0.0427 X
icmp.type 0.0086 X
icmp.seq 0.2114 X
icmp.code 0.0 x
tcp.srcport 0.0005 X
tcp.dstport 0.0006 X
tcp.hdr len 0.0006 X
tcp.window size 0.0005 X
tcp.checksum 0.0002 X
tcp.connection.syn 0.0 x
tcp.analysis.ack r 0.0 x
udp.srcport 0.0008 X
udp.checksum 0.0003 X
udp.stream 0.0022 X
dns.ags 0.0003 X
dns.id 0.0003 X
dns.qry.name.len1 0.0066 X
dns.count.queries 0.0052 X
hp.request 0.0 x
hp.response number 0.0162 X
hp.chunk size1 0.1049 x
tls.handshake.version 0.0045 X
tls.handshake3 0.0 x
dhcp.id 0.0017 X
• Identication of individual device type (based on de-
vice name): In this scenario, we utilize both datasets to
identify specic device type using our proposed DFP ap-
proach.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we describe our experimental process and results
based on the two datasets. First, we extracted all the devices orig-
inated network packets or instances from the individual device
(.pcap les) by using T-shark [8], with each device identied based
on their MAC address or IP address. en, all the device instances
were ltered according to the selected protocols used for our DFP
approach and were also labeled according to the individual device
type and genre.
All the devices information (46 IoT devices) from both datasets
are listed in Table 2 and Table 3, on which our proposed DFP ap-
proach was carried out. In our experiment to evaluate the features,
Figure 3: Individual device total number of distinct values
of a feature
we used approximately 100 packets from each device to compute
the three metrics explained in Section 5.
However, from our observation, we noticed that in most of the
cases, the total number of distinct values of a feature varies from 0
to 100, as shown in Figure 3 e.g. IP address has one distinct value
for each device. Hence, we do not consider a feature with a large
number of distinct values in our metrics computation separately.
We assume that these types of features always provide a prominent
result for DFP.
Table 6: Total number of instances (or packets) used for
training and validation
Dataset Devices Training Validation Total
70% 30% 100%
IoT Sentinel 27 69489 29782 99271
UNSW 19 7474 3204 10678
6.1 Classication Performance
Every dataset instances (or packets) were randomly divided into a
training dataset (70% of the dataset) and a validation dataset (30%
of the dataset) by using WEKA tool to perform device classication
or identication based on ML algorithms. We used unsupervised-
resample function to split the datasets accordingly. Initially, we
select the suitable feature subset from the aributes list in WEKA
preprocess stage based on the metrics evaluation results and a
threshold value calculated from the dataset to remove insignicant
features. We performed metrics evaluation process two thousand
times with dierent sets of packets and nally averaged the suit-
ability metric values to assign a score for each feature. Table 6 lists
the total number of instances used for our DFP approach according
to dierent datasets and Table 7 reports the total number of fea-
tures selected according to the threshold values in our experiment.
From our observation, we notice that when the threshold value de-
creased devices identication accuracy and the number of features
increased respect to the individual dataset.
Table 7: Total number of selected features based on λ value
Dataset Total Number reshold Selected Features
of Features (λ)
IoT Sentinel 218 0.0 161
UNSW 218 0.0004 86
To assess the proposed DFP method classication performance,
we used several ML classication algorithms to identify individual
device genre and device type based on a single packet from each de-
vice. By using IoT Sentinel dataset [10] our method achieved mean
classication accuracy of 99.37% for device genre with threshold
value 0.0 experimentally, as shown in Figure 4. ere were total 12
genres or groups of devices namely Aria, D-Link (D-LinkCam, D-
LinkDayCam, D-LinkDoorSensor, D-LinkHomeHub, D-LinkSensor,
D-LinkSiren, D-LinkSwitch and D-LinkWaterSensor), Hue (HueSwitch
and HueBridge), Smarter (iKele2 and SmarterCoee), Lightify,
MAXGateway, TP-Link (TP-LinkPlugHS100 and TP-LinkPlugHS110),
WeMo (WeMoInsightSwitch, WeMoLink and WeMoSwitch) and
Withings. We grouped the devices based on their manufacture
name or device name if a single device from the manufacture in the
dataset.
Figure 4: IoT Sentinel dataset: device genre classication
performance
Figure 4 presents our proposed DFP scheme aained higher clas-
sication accuracy compared with SysID. However, the Smarter
group of devices exhibited lower classication performance by us-
ing the proposed method. However, overall the proposed method
reached a higher classication rate to identify individual manufac-
turer with multiple devices.
In terms of individual device type classication performance,
the proposed scheme achieved overall 83.35% of accuracy using
IoT Sentinel dataset [10] as shown in Figure 5(a) Although the
method was unable to provide higher rate of classication accu-
racy on some of the devices but the proposed scheme combined
with IP address (as a feature) reached maximum accuracy up to
99.77%. On the other hand, SysID achieved approximately 79.20%
of accuracy using the same dataset. Figure 7 exhibits the confusion
matrix of the proposed algorithm (83.35% accuracy), while rows
dene individual device type (or real device) and columns show
predicted classication. It would be the optimal case when all the
instances from a dataset intersect at the point of both actual and
predicted classes. For example, 179 instances from HomeMatic-
Plug were precisely classied as HomeMaticPlug. However, for the
SmarterCoee, 9 packets were classied correctly as SmarterCoee
and other 7 packets were identied incorrectly as Lightify, which
indicated the wrong classication.
Furthermore, Figure 6 (a) exhibits individual device classica-
tion accuracy based on the proposed method (with and without
IP address) and SysID. Although the proposed scheme (without
IP address) classied most of the devices correctly compare with
SysID, in some cases like as D-LinkSwitch, TP-LinkPlugHS100, We-
MoSwitch, the scheme was not able to identify accurately as SysID.
In the experiment on UNSW dataset [16], we observed that our pro-
posed method and SysID provided almost similar results, as shown
in Figure 5(b) and Figure 6 (b), where both methods achieved classi-
cation accuracy over 97%. From the both gures, it was noticeable
that our proposed method able to achieve 99.93% of accuracy when
we included IP address (such as ip.src) as a feature with the selected
subset of features. However, Figure 6 (b) presents both methods
(SysID and the proposed scheme) performed higher classication
precision except for some cases, like as BelkinSwitch and Blip-
careBpMeter. From the experimental results on UNSW dataset, we
noticed that our proposed DFP method achieved approximately
similar accuracy as SysID. Even though both algorithms used a
single TCP/IP packet for device identication. SysID performed
higher precision when device types varies, but when devices from
the same manufacturer performance decline gradually. On the
other hand, our proposed DFP scheme exhibits comparatively good
result even when a manufacturer with multiple devices.
Experimental results shown in Figure 6 indicate that the accuracy
of the proposed DFP method is improved by using IP address as one
of the features to incorporate with the selected feature subset. In a
network, every device must have a unique IP address to commu-
nicate over the network nevertheless, it is spoofed or altered. Our
DFP scheme can utilize this IP address with other features to detect
a device type, which helps to mitigate spoong aack. Hence, our
proposed method achieved 99.77% accuracy from 83.35% to classify
individual device type using IP address as an additional feature on
IoT Sentinel dataset. Furthermore tested on UNSW dataset includ-
ing IP address the proposed DFP approach achieved approximate
99.93% of accuracy.
7 RELATEDWORK
e process of gathering device-specic signature from the analysis
of network trac to form a device ngerprint and using them by
various classication algorithms to identify individual device type
or genre provide signicant solutions to distinct research issues. In
our study, we mainly focus on network trac (or packets) analysis
(a) IoT Sentinel dataset (b) UNSW dataset
Figure 5: Overall classication performance: (a) IoT Sentinel dataset and (b) UNSW dataset
based DFP approaches and publicly available commonly used two
datasets namely IoT Sentinel [10] dataset and UNSW [16] dataset,
which consists of dierent types of IoT devices.
A DFP approach proposed based on the analysis of 12 consecu-
tive network packets from a target device by Mieinen et al. [10].
e authors extracted 23 features from a packet header includes
Link layer (ARP, LLC), Network layer (IP, ICMP, ICMPv6, EAPoL),
Transport layer (TCP, UDP) and Application layer (HTTP, HTTPS,
DHCP, BOOTP, SSDP, DNS, MDNS, NTP) protocols, IP options,
Packet content, IP address and Port class to form (12 ∗ 23) = 276-
dimensional feature vector for a device ngerprint. e set of
features represented as binary (0 or 1) and integer values, whereas
binary values 1 dene some protocols are used during communica-
tion. However, from each device, a set of ngerprints are utilized
to train a model using Random Forest classication algorithm to
perform device identication. e scheme generates one classier
per device type. While a new device type ngerprints captured by
the scheme, it is required to train a new classier to avoid any mod-
ication of the existing classiers. Overall, the scheme achieved
identication accuracy of 81.50% (global ratio) over the 27 devices
from IoT Sentinel dataset [10]. In comparison, our scheme uses
less number of protocol header information from a single packet to
construct a device ngerprint and we are able to classify devices
(type or genre) by using a single classier.
Bezawada et al. [4] presented a device identication mecha-
nism based on the analysis of devices behavioral ngerprint. e
researchers extracted 20 features from a packet, which includes dis-
tinct protocols from the Link layer, Network layer, Transport layer
and Application layer, IP options, entropy of payload, TCP payload
length and TCP windows size. While the 17 features are utilized
as binary values of 0 or 1 to represent the absence or presence of a
particular feature and the 3 other features use as numerical values.
e authors grouped device originated 5 packets (as a session) to
form a feature vector of (5 ∗ 20) = 100 features for a device nger-
printing. Finally, these feature vectors are used to train a machine
learning classication algorithm to predict the device type. From
the test-bed of 10 unique devices, the scheme achieved a true posi-
tive rate of 99.0% to 100.0% using all the selected features. ough,
the identication accuracy decreased on average 2% without using
payload entropy. In contrast, we use only the packet header infor-
mation to preserve the privacy of users’ data and generate a feature
vector from a single TCP/IP packet.
Ammar et al. [2] described a DFP approach based on the analysis
of service discovery protocols (mDNS and SSDP), DHCP and HTTP
protocols on IoT Sentinel [10] dataset and their own dataset. e
authors extracted features as textual information from the rst
few sets of device originated packets. is textual information
from each device modelled as a binary data by using the Bag of
Words (BOW) technique for device identication. e scheme rst
extracts a list of unique words from all devices and then each device
information turn into a feature vector, whereas a binary value set
to 1 if the word present in the device information and set to 0 if
not. en all the devices information are used to form a matrix
while each column denes a unique word and each row represents
a device. For classication, devices are evaluated using a similarity
verication process. e scheme identied 31 devices among 33 of
the unique test devices. However, in some cases, accuracy can be
decreased when IoT devices may not use any discovery protocol.
Comparing to this scheme, our method uses packet header features
of protocols in Table 4 to train a model using ML classication
algorithm for device identication.
Guo et al. [9] discussed a device identication approach using
network trac analysis and knowledge of devices manufacturer
server names. e scheme tracked a list of server names each device
communicate regularly and then dened a threshold number of
server names require for device identication. Server names are
ltered to exclude third-party and human-facing servers to improve
accuracy. e authors examined the presence of server names in
network trac from a given IP address to identify what types of
IoT devices present in the network.
From a controlled experiment on 10 IoT devices and 15 non-IoT
devices, the reported accuracy of the scheme was 96%. Our method
has some signicant dierences. We use only packet header features
to identify devices without tracking any server names along with
IP address. Our scheme can be used to identify IoT devices in a
network where manufacturer of the devices are dierent. When
the manufacturer is same in our scheme e.g. 8 D-Link devices the
individual device identication is not suciently competent 85.35%
without IP address and 99.77% with IP address.
(a) IoT Sentinel dataset (b) UNSW dataset
Figure 6: Individual device type classication performance: (a) IoT Sentinel dataset and (b) UNSW dataset
Aksoy et al. [1] proposed a DFP method to identify an IoT device
(type or genre) using any single TCP/IP packet content from the
device.
e scheme analyzed the Network layer (IP, ICMP), Transport
layer (TCP, UDP) and Application layer (DNS, HTTP and SSL) pro-
tocols header information to extract 212 features from each packet.
en applied a genetic algorithm (GA) to select feature subsets
to create device ngerprint. ese selected feature subsets used
to train various ML classication algorithms to identify devices.
e scheme utilizes two-level of classication to improve accu-
racy. Whereas rst determine the manufacture of devices and then
identify individual device type from the same manufacturer using
dierent classiers. e experiment on IoT Sentinel [10] dataset
over the 23 IoT devices the average classication accuracy was 82%
for the cumulative of all the devices and over 95% of precision for
device genre classication. However, the scheme was not able to
achieve a higher rate of accuracy since some devices had similar
network behaviors from the same manufacturer. e main dier-
ence between our scheme and SysID is feature subset evaluation
process. We use character-level analysis of each feature based on
the three metrics, while SysID uses a GA to select feature subsets
to generate device ngerprinting.
Sivanathan et al. [16] described a framework for IoT devices
classication approach by using statistical analysis of network traf-
c characteristics. e authors extracted network trac passively
to compute trac characteristics. To characterize network trac
from a device, the authors converted all the raw pcap les into
ows using the Joy tool on an hourly basis and then calculated
statistical aributes of trac activity paerns (ow volume, ow
duration, average ow rate and device sleep time) and signalling
paerns (server port numbers, DNS queries, NTP queries and Ci-
pher suite). is framework consists of two stages, in Stage-0 each
multi-valued aributes are fed into corresponding Naive Bayes
classiers in the form of BoW to generate two outputs - a tentative
class and a condence level and outputs are provided into the next
stage. In Stage-1, all the quantitative aributes from trac ow
and outputs of Stage-0 use to train a classier based on the Random
Forest algorithm to perform device identication. e accuracy of
the experiment was above 99% for a set of 28 IoT devices. However,
the scheme requires a large number of packets from a network ow
for statistical analysis.
In contrast, our scheme uses a single TCP/IP packet header in-
formation for classication of devices, while features are evaluated
using the three metrics.
Robyns et al. [13] presented mobile devices ngerprinting scheme
based on a single Probe-Request frame. e scheme used per bit
entropy analysis of the frames from dierent devices using the
three metrics evaluation process to construct device ngerprint
(bit paerns), while frames captured by monitoring stations (MSs)
without concern of device users. is non-cooperative MAC layer
ngerprinting method uses to track mobile devices location. e
accuracy of the scheme achieved between 80.0% to 67.6% for a small
dataset of 50 to 100 devices, while for a large dataset of 1000 to
10000 devices the accuracy varied from 33.0% to 15.1%. e scheme
provides a mechanism to defeat MAC address randomization prob-
lem conjunction with some temporal information. In comparison,
our method uses in a home network to capture network packets on
an AP and features are extracted from each packet header informa-
tion to construct suitable feature subset for device ngerprinting.
In our DFP scheme, features are evaluated on character-level using
the three metrics to identify the most suitable feature subset.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a DFP approach using device originated
network trac (or packets) and machine learning classication
algorithms to identify individual device type or genre based on a
single packet header features. We learned the most suitable feature
subset automatically by utilizing three metrics assessment process
of the features. is process assigned a score to every feature
according to their signicance for device identication, whereas
a user-dened threshold value helped to remove noisy features
and improve classication accuracy. Overall, the proposed DFP
scheme achieved 99.37% of precision to identify each device genre
and 83.35% of accuracy to classify individual device type from IoT
Sentinel dataset. However, for some devices, the proposed method
was not able to achieve a higher rate of accuracy since some devices
have similar network behaviors from the same manufacturer. On
the other hand, the scheme reached a mean accuracy of 97.78%
using UNSW dataset, where most of the devices were from the
dierent manufacturers.
In future, we will investigate other packet header features logged
from the network protocols during communication to identify
unique feature subset to improve accuracy of the same manufac-
turer e.g. D-Link 20 devices. Moreover, the problem will be more
intense when nding feature for the same device from the same
manufacturer e.g. 20 D-Link Cam.
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